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HIGH TECHNOLOGY VS. SELF-RELIANCE: BRAZIL
ENTERS THE COMPUTER AGE
Simon Schwartzman
By the end of 1984 a bilidefining a "national policy
for informatics"l was approved by the Brazilian Congress by a
large majority of votes from government and the opposition parties.
It was preceded . by a lively debate reminiscent of the period
before the setting up of the country's oil state monopoly and
Petrobras in the early fifties. Once more the issue was pre-
sented as a dilemma between national autonomy and self-determi-
nation, on one hand, and control of the country's resources by
international companies and their local associates on the other.
Once more the campaign gathered intense support, from national-
ist military groups to intellectuals and left-wing political
parties.
It is remarkable that the Law of Informatics was ap-
proved in. the twilight of the military regime, when most of
its ambitious projects of the Seventies had already proved mo-
numental fiascos . The true extent and reasons for this disas-
ter are still to be evaluated. The official line was to blame
the oil shocks and high interest rates, which put the country's
external debt and internal inflation almost out of control, and
forced the implementation of recessive policies. But there were
also over-ambitious projects, like the nuclear program, the
"steel railroad" between Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro and the
hydroelectric plants of Itaipu and Tuc.urui; unrealistic cptimism,
like the one surrounding the Caraj"s project; and sheer misma -
nagement and corruption, like in the- naval industry program.
All these elements played some part. The fact was that charges
that the State bureaucracy's policies were wasteful, ineffici-
ent, and corrupt abounded and played an important role in the
political change that led to Tancredo Neves' election to the
Presidency in early 1985.
*Paper presented for the M.I.T. Symposium on "The Computer Question
in Brazil," Cambridge, Mass., April 16, 1985.
2The national "informatics" policy (we shall refer to
it in the acronym PNI), however, was not affected. In spite of
being a governmental project with strong military backing, it
also had support in the academic community, and was presented
as a purely national project based on private enterprise, making
use of national competence and confronting the pressures of
multinational interests. At the end, it drew opposition from
the official candidate to the presidency, Paulo Maluf, who was
already politically isolated, and support from his winning op-
ponent. Thus, from a political standpoint, the "informatics"
law was some kind of paradox, and a remarkable political achieve-
ment.
In this article we try to show that this policy and
the institutions it created are not an anomalous or extraordi-
nary event in Brazil, but are well ingrained in the country's
policy-making tradition. Nationalism, we will contend, is its
most apparent feature, but not the most important one. Once we
understand the origins of this policy, we can draw a picture
of the main actors involved in shaping it, how they act and
what they have been able to achieve. With these elements, we
might be able to speculate about the current strengths and
weaknesses of PNI, the problems it may have and what one can
expect about it in the near future.
1. Framework
The role of the State in promoting industrial development
in Brazil has been a constant feature in the country's recent
history, and has been subject to detailed scrutiny (see among
others Leff, 1968; Martins, 1976; and Wirth, 1973). In some
cases, this role has been exerted by the creation of companies
owned and run as part of the state's administration, like the
Vogt e r da steel mill in the Forties and Petrobras in the
Fifties.. In many other instances, the government provided pri-
vileges and protection to private groups to run their own in-
3dustries, creating fiscal barriers for competitive irrports, pro-
viding special tax exemptions and credit facilities.
When the State gets involved in industrial promotion
it affects not only the amount of goods produced and the dis-
tribution of wealth in society, but the country's whole social
and political fabric - how interest groups are established,how
class conflicts are carried on, how the political parties be-
have, and how government itself is organized and run (see for
instance Gershenkron, 1962; Polanyi, 1957; and Bendix, 1956). An
excellent framework to understand this complex reality has
been recently proposed by Edson de Oliveira Nunes, who suggests
that Brazilian politics and policy-making should be understood
in terms of four different and shifting "grammars", namely cli-
entelism, corporatism, bureaucratic insulation and procedural
universalism (Nunes, 1984).
One could say, accordingly, that since the Thirties
Brazilian industrialization and economic modernization have
been promoted typically by administrative groups acting under
bureaucratic insulation, as a protection against clientelist
distributivism, or a way to assure control of some key.resources
against foreign or private interests. As a given policy develops,
new actors are called in, and corporatist structures are put
forward to discipline and control the interests involved. In
a later stage, there are pressures to generalize access of dif-
ferent actors and interest groups to new fields of activity.
In some cases, as in the development of the country's automo-
bile industry and other projects during the Kubitschek govern-
ment, the policies were carried on by "executive groups" with
full authority and working directly under presidential supervi-
sion. For the automobile industry, special benefits were pro-
vided for large multinftional corporations to establish them-
selves in the country. Competition among the companies was re-
gulated, nationalization targets for components were set, and
salaries were controlled by the country's corporatist labor le-
gislation. Entrance of new companies was not allowed (except
later for Fiat, which accepted to get established in Minas Ge-
rais and got strong backing from that state's government). A
different example is oil production. Here, the policy of ex-
cluding private groups and foreign companies started in the
Thirties,and resulted in the creation of Petrobrcs in the Fifties,
as a state-controlled company with legal monopoly over the oil
industry. (Some residual placc was left for private and foreigi
companies for refining and retail distribution, under close go-
vernmental control).
Whether bureaucratic insulation leads to policies of
one of those two types is neither trivial nor inconsequential.
A prerequisite in both cases is the existence of an active groip
with political access which can get support at the highest pos-
sible levels, without going through the more traditional channels
of clientelistic politics - which usually means to avoid Con-
gress and the political parties. In some cases, this group
comes from a more "modernized" sector of the State's adminis-
tration, including the armed forces. In others, it comes al-
ready with strong links with private, national or foreign inte-
rests, and acts as "bureaucratic rings" linking public and pri-
vate interests. In the first stage of a new policy, the cha -
racteristics of this group are probably crucial in determining
its policy's content and orientations. At latter stages, hgw -
ever, all will depend on its capacity to put foward its ideas,
the other interests that get involved, and the whole political
climate in which decisions are taken.
Here again the example of oil is interesting. In the
Thirties Monteiro Lobato, a well known intellectual and entre,-
peneur, organized his own company to find oil in Brazil and
drew the wrath of officials in government who wanted to keep
oil extraction under state control. Lobato accused the admi-
nistration of working in alliance with American companies to keep
Brazil out of oil production, and tried to associate with Ger-
man interests (later, he became a symbol of economic nationalism
and is considered one of the forefathers of Petrobras). It is
possible to identify, behind these differences in policy, the
clash of groups with different institutional and even regional
5. . 2
origins.
Corporatism functions as a mechanism to define who
should participate, and what benefits they should get from that
participation. This expression is often used to characterize
the relations between workers and employers in Brazil, which
are minutely regulated by law and supervised by the State. Its
scope, however, is much larger, including a wide range of spe-
cial privileges granted to citizens with some specific qualifi-
cations (usually university diplomas) and benefits, subsidies
and other forms of special treatment provided to some economic
groups, in exchange for close governmental supervision and con-
trol.
Corporatism and bureaucratic insulation are useful
to protect specific projects and instituticns from political pa -
tronage and universalism. Few people are openly in favor of
political patronage or clientelism, that is, the distribution
of public jobs on strictly political grounds, with total disre -
gard for the recipients' qualifications and entitlements. Uni-
versalism, however - the notion that there should be no special
monopolies and privileges, but open competition based on merit
and competence - is a much more legitimate stand. . Bureaucratic
insulation and corporatism can easely function as protections
for inefficiency and privilege, hidden under the banners of pa-
triotism or national security. In order to have competition,
however, one should have competitors, and it certainly' mnakes
sense to try to build them up in the country instead of paying
the price of opening it fully to foreign interests without ap-
propriate restraints and controls. 3
2. Origins: bureaucratic insulation
In the late Sixties Brazil started a large program
for scientific and technological development with support from
the National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimen-
6 .
to Econ'mico). For the first time S&T was defined as part of
the country's economic development strategy, and resources be-
came available in much larger scale than ever before. Support
was provided to research groups deemed competent with a minimm
of bureaucratic complications and bypassing both the university
administration (for academic groups) and peer review procedures.
In hindsight, it is clear that this was a typical case of bure-
aucratic insulation. There was little coordination between this
policy, carried through under the umbrella of the Ministry of
Planning, and the economic and industrial policies that took
place under other Ministers with different orientations.
Insulation from clientelism, bureaucracy, and short-
term economic pressures was indispensable to provide space,
tire and conditions for scientific and technological research
to flourish. Research groups need to be exposed to the -arger
scientific community, on one hand, and to possibilities of ap-
plications, on the other, in order not to get sterilized. Sci-
entific exposure is a constant demand of high quality research
groups, and it was possible to provide them with the resources
for that. The results are quite impressive. Although small by
international standards, the Brazilian scientific and technolo -
gical community is today the largest in any developing country
after India (Schwartzman, 1978 and 1979; Castro, 1985). It has
about 20 thousand professional researchers, and about one thou-
sand graduate programs in all fields of knowledge. Extensive
fellowship programs allowed thousands of graduate students to
go to the best universities in the United States and Europe,
and they have usually found places to work upon their return.
Quality is uneven, and in the last few years there has been a
tendency to divert scarce resources towards politically protec -
ted, low quality groups in peripheral universities. However,
the best graduate and research institutions are of first qua -
lity.
Practical economic results coming from all this in -
vestment have been limited, but tt would be misleading to at -
7tribute it to some kind of ivory tower attitude. Investments
have been made in engineering, solid-state physics, tropical
medicine, agricultural research and other fields with potential
practical usage. However, industrial policy not always favo -
red the utilization and growth of this potential, and scientists,
mostly in the technological fields, have always felt bitter
about the waste of their energy and intellectual capacity. 4
Computer science and electronics were among the
fields developed under these conditions, and a new, nationalist
pclicy for informatics provided them with an opportunity most
other areas did not have.5 In the early Seventies the Brazilian
Navy was operating its ships using English Ferranti computers,
and wanted to support a program to develop the country's capa-
bility to build its own data-processing equipments. There was
a question of national security involved, which became thereaf-
ter a central justification for the national computer policy.
A pilot project started with Navy's support involving the
School of Engineering of the University of Sao Paulo, which
had the competence to work on hardware, and the computer group
of the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, working on software.
The first Brazilian computer, the Patinho Feio (Ugly Duckling),
came to light after some time, and two prototypes of an impro-
ved version, the G-10, existed in the two universities in early
1976. Cobra, a state-controlled company, was organized in 1975
to produce the G-10 industrially. However, its first option
was to assemble computers using Ferranti (English) and Sycor
(American) technology, with the understanding that this techno-
logy would be fully incorporated by the Brazilians. The Brazi-
lian prototypes were left for research work. A holding company
for the computer industr, Digibras, was also established, as
well as a supervising governmental agency, Capre, under the Mi-
nistry of Planning. From Capre emerged the initial steps of a
nationalistic policy which included a few basic principles: to
create a group of 100% nationally owned campanies which could
develop their own technology or purchase it from abroad,. and
only to accept foreign cooperation with arrangements for full
8technological disclosure (Adler, forthcoming).
A crucial decision was about which segment of the
computer industry Brazilian firms could occupy. The field of
large, all purpose mainframes was already taken by IBM, Bur. -
roughs and other international companies, and it was out of
question. These were the years before the micro-computer revo-
lution, and the decision was to go for the minicomputer indus -
try. In 1976 IBM announced in Brazil a small computer system,
called /32, in what was considered a preemptive move to occupy
this market's segment. The protacted dispute between IBM and
Capre, in the next two years, led -to the establishment of an
import licensing policy for computer equipments which required,
among other things, an association between foreign and Brazilian
firms, and growing indexes of nationalization. In late 1977
Capre decided to authorize three Brazilian companies to produce
minicomputers with technical assistance agreements with foreign
associates, and to the exclusion of IBM, Burroughs and Control
Oata (Silvia Helena, 1984).
In 1979 the Brazilian government issued an official
document setting up the National Policy for Informatics (PNI),
wich included the concept of a market reserve for micro and
minicomputers for Brazilian companies. It also replaced Capre
by the Secretaria Nacional de Informatica, SEI, as an agency
under the National Security Council. As part of the military
intelligence establishment in an authoritarian regime, SEI's
power was almost unlimited. It controlled imports, intervened
in the creation of new industries, in the organization of data
processing centers in companies and universities, and in the
granting of federal subsidies to private firms. It could and
it did interfere in all branches of government having to do
with data processing - which means all of them. This power con-
centration was perceived as incompatible with the democratic
regime that was to start in 1985, and that is why SEI needed a
legal mandate, which was granted by Congress at the end of
1984.
93. Growth: corporatism
As stated earlier, the involvement of university de -
partments in the early days of the computer policy provided it
with strong ties with the university community, which was very
helpful in providing it with technical competence and legiti -
mation. Several among these academics later created their own
computer companies, which benefited from the public support
and privileges they helped to create. Capre's replacement by
SEI generated tensions between this group and many newcomers
to the field, some of them coming from the military intelligence
and with little knowledge or trust in previous Capm leadership.
These tensions were later reduced through better knowledge and
change of some actors. This reduction was helped by the fact
that most of the military officers involved with PNI had also
been trained in the field, and were therefore able to relate
intelligently with the academic community and to reinforce an
image of competence and efficiency. They came from the more
technical sectors or the Brazilian Navy and military educational
institutions - the Instituto Militar de Engenharia (IME) in Rio
and the Instituto Tecnologico da Aeronautica (ITA) in Sao Pau-
lo, and many of them have been trained abroad.6 A lobby
composed of academics, officers, entrepreneurs, students and
computer professionals was developed and played a very active
role in shaping PNI.
Brazilian firms, which in 1978 produced only 2% of
the total installed value, had moved to 19% in 1982. In the
micro- and mini class, however, Brazilian firms went from 17%
to 80% of the market, which had increased fourfold in these
four years. Comparisons between the national and multinational
sectors of the computer industry in Brazil show that they have&
similar sizes, with the multinational sector being more capi -
tal intensive, doing less R&D and selling slightly more than the
Brazilian one (table 1).
This change occurred not only because of policy deci -
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sions, but also thanks to the micro-computer revolution, which
opened new opportunities for the Brazilian computer industry.
For the first time, it was possible for small firns to assemble
computer equipment through the utilization of off-the-shelf
components, and the technical competence needed for that was
well within the reach of the Brazilian eletronics industry. In
1983 there were about 54 Brazilian computer manufacturers, of
which only 11 existed prior to 1974; 25 where created after
1978. These firms started producing "clones" of Sinclair, TRS,
and Apple computers, mostly with copied softwareand operational
systems. Peripherals were also produced or assembled in the
country - printers, modems, terminals, videos. Adaptations had
to be made in software and keyboards for the introduction of
Portuguese language and special graphic signs.
There are at least three main types of Brazilian com -
puter manufacturers. First, there are the state-owned corpora -
tions. The most important is Cobra, responsible for about 25%
of the capital, 16% of the sales and 12% of the manpower of
the Brazilian sector. According to international standards,
however, it is not a large firm: Cobra's capital for 1983 was
only around 15 billion cruzeiros (US$ 15m). Its capital was
formed mostly with public funds, and for several years it was
troubled with problems of low performance and reluctance of pri-
vate shareholders to increase their investment levels. It con-
centrates on the segment of mini and mid-size computers, and
is showing signs of improvement in the last few years. A
special place is taken by Pr6logo S/A, a subsidiary of Indus-
tria de Material Belico do Brasal (Imbel), the Brazilian state-
-owned armaments manufacturer. It is a company meant to serve
the computer needs of the country's intelligence agencies and
the military. It was created in 1980 by a Presidential de cree ,
with a mandate to work in the fields of comunications security
and cryptotechnology. Today, according to Jornal do Brasil,
Imbel's production ranges from the Production of sophisticated
military equipments to civilian versions of banking computeri-
zation and control, and is moving into the productian of robots
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Table 1
Comparisons between Brazilian and multinational
computer firms (1983)
national
firms
multinational
firms
Total sold (US$m)
total employed
total employed in hardware/
sofware development
number of employees with
university degrees
number of employees with
university degrees per
100 million dollars sold
number of employees with
university degrees per
100 million dollars of
equipment installed
million dollars imported
imports/total sold
Source: SEI, 1984.
687
15,734
1,117
3,888
800
10,010
121
2,810
566 351
54
49
8
179
7,1% 22 ,4%
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with technology acquired from Asea AB, a Swedish firm. Prologo
is located in *Bpsilia, employs 450 people, and is said to be
wholly self-sufficient economically (Jornal do Brasil, February
25, 1985).8
Secondly, there are companies formed by individual
entrepreneurs coming from the university and other areas. The
most quoted example is Scopus in Sao Paulo, which produces among
other things an IBM-PC equivalent, Nexus, and has been corpared
with Apple for its style (although not, certainly, for its
size). Other companies have developed from small electronics
and engineering firms.
Finally, and more recently, come the conpanies linked
to the banking system. These companies, quite understandably,
are those that are growing more intensively. The best examples
are, probably, Ita' Tecnologia, controlled by Itad Bank, the
second largest in the country, and SID Informatica, controlled
by the Mathias Machine group, 18% of which belongs to Banco
Bradesco, the country's largest bank. Itai, which was already
the 4th company in the ranking in terms of capital in 1983,
was expected to come first and above Cobra in 1984, with a
staff of 1,600. Two other companies to produce electronic com-
ponents (Itaucomp) and printed circuits (this one in Manaus)
were also established by Itai in 1984. SID sold in 1983 about
twelve thousand units of equipment and increased its working
staff from 800 to 1,200, and invests 7% of its sales in R&D.
Other fast-growing industries include Edisa, with 325 systems
sold in 1983 and in 14th place in the ranking; and Dismac,
with 2,000 micros sold in 1984 (as against 1,500 in 1983) and
about 1 US$ million a year in R&D (0 Globo, December 31, 1984).
The rapid growth of the computer field and the press
coverage it receives helped to make it one of the most prestigious
careers in the country's universities and technical schools.
For the unified entrance examinations to the universities in
Rio de Janeiro for 1985 there were about 18 candidates for each
13
place in courses related to computer sciences. The number of
candidates for these courses increased by 420% in four years.
(Jornal do Brasil, November 23 and 24, 1984). No figures were
given for the total number of places available. However, com-
puter sciences (or informatics, in Brazilian terminology) is
placed within mathematics, for which there were about 10 thou-
sand candidates for about 1,000 places (The average ratio for
all areas was 3.4). The picture for the state of Sao Paulo is
similar.
This demand is related to a movement for the creation
of a protected labor market for professionals in the field of
computer sciences and data processing. They are already organr
ized in the Associagao de Profissionais de Processamento de Da-
dos (APPD) which has been very active in promoting legislation
to protect its slice of the labor market. The notion that, to
each field of knowledge, should correspond a university degree,
a legally protected profession and a slice of the employment
market with guaranteed salaries, is part of Brazil's corporatist
tradition and is extremely ingrained in the country's culture
and legislation. Legally defined professions today include not
only Engineering, Law and Medicine, but also Administration,
Statistics, Journalism, Psychology, Pharmacy, Biology, Econom-
ics, Archeology, Nursery, Social Work, and so forth. There is
a bill being examined by Congress creating a Federal Council
of Professionals in Eletronic Data Processing. This council,
differently from the traditional corporations of medical doc-
tors, lawyers or engineers, would include from terminal oper-
ators to system analysts. The new council would control the
entrance requirements to jobs performing these activities and
see that their working conditions and salary levels are those
defined by law. Senator Roberto Campos points out that the
use of computers is becoming a personal routine for profession-
als in all fields, but this law, if approved, would restrict
its use for those accredited before that federal council. Since
Campos is well-known for his strong opposition to SEI and all
its policies, his criticism against this bill is likely to be
discounted as just another one of his attacks. The Brazilian
14
tr&itin is to approve this type of legislation for all kinds
of quasi-professions, and it is not unlikely that, Campos's
good arguments notwithstanding, it will happen again.
There is nothing so far in terms of regulation for
software, probably because it is so much more difficult to con-
trol its imports, and also because of obvious conflicts of in -
terest. Most manufacturers try to make their equipment as
compatible as possible with software available in the interna-
tional market, while software producers would rather have the
equipment restricted to national programs, which could be sold
for high prices. Some manufacturers have opted for equipment
that only works with their own software and vice-versa, leading
to expensive products with limited sales. There are plans to
adopt UNIX as a common operational system for the Brazilian
computer industry, a set of national standards and the intro-
duction of new, advanced technologies for software production.
All this, however, is still at the planning stage. Public domain
software are non-existent and not planned for; smuggling and
illegal copying, however, are widespread.
One could uam up by saying that the field of caputer
production and operation is being organized in Brazil according
to the views and interests of its promoters, produce rs and pro -
fessionals, and that this organization follows the usukpattern
of corporatist regulation and protection. How long this tendency
will hold depend on their capacity to confront three challenges:
the changes in the political system, which threatens bureau-
cratic insulation; the pressures of a growing user's market,
which requires quality, services and low prices; and the pres-
sures of international competition, which looms behind the
market's pressure in its demand for universalism. Success will
depend, in part, on political variables; but it will also depend
on the computer industry's capacity to step up its research ef -
fort and respond effectively to the internal demands and for-
eign competition.
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4. First challenge: users
The existence of a nationalized industry and a pro -
tected labor force in data processing supposes a significant
number of users at the receiving end. The computer market in
Brazil has been well analyzed by researchers from the Institu-
to de Economia Industrial in Rio de Janeiro (Tigre, Erber, Pi-
ragibe), and we shall only give a brief summary here.
The new computer policy started when computer usage
was already well established and a fairly large market for im-
ported equipment existed in many governmental agencies, univer-
sities, banks, and companies. In 1976 there Were about 5,000
computers in the country, of which 172 were considered "large"
or "very layge", and 3,300 "mini" (Marques, ABICOMP 84, p. 18).
In terms of value, the segment of large equipments ("mid-size"
and above) corresponded to about 1,000 million dollars in 1976,
as against 144 million dollars for the micro and minis. The to-
tal value increased from "US$. 1,235m in 1978 to US$ 2,777t in
1982 (Erber, 1985).
In 1981 about 25% of the computers in the country were
installed in banks, 13% in service bureaus and the rest scat-
tered among different types of industry and public utilities
(SEI, quoted by Erber, 1985). This information ignores, of
course, the widely different capacities of the equipments. The
Brazilian government is one of the largest computer users in
the country. It owns the largest service, Serpro, which handles
among other things the income tax data processing. Other large
users are Dataprev, the data processing company from the social
security system and the IBGE (the census bureau). Besides,
there are computer systems in all large state-owned and state-
controlled companies, including the public utilities (water,
telephone and electricity) and state-owned banks. Most univer-
sities have their own computer centers. The country's main
airports, banks, and airlines are becoming fully computerized.
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Table 2
Characteristics of the Brazilian conputer
industry, 1983
Number of finns 4
Total capital: 58 billion cruzeiros/1983
narinal growth 1982/3 141%
Ccentration: largest (CDBRA) 25,4%
of sales 2nd largest 36,5%
10th largest 78,4%
% of sales: microconputers 28,0%
miniconputers 44,1
peripherals 18,0
other conpcnents 9,9
total 100%
Geographical ccncentmtion of sales:
State of S. Paulo 46,4%
State of Rio de Janeiro 26,4
Rio Grande do Sul 5,3
Brasilia 5,2
4 regions 83,3%
Geographical concentration of production:
State of S. Paulo 67,8
State of Rio de Janeiro 21,4
Rio Grande do Sul 8,4
Others 2,4
Type of buyers:
Goverment 9,0%
Comnerce 16,8
Industry 28,2
Financial sector 30,0
Services 15,6
Total 100%
Employees:
primary education 21,2%
secondary 50,1
higher 28,7
Total 100% (N=15,734)
(cont.)
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Table 2 (cont.)
Activities of enployees with higher education:
sales, marketing 19,7%
administration 25,9
production 14, 3
technical assistance 12,0
product develcpnent 24,7
training 0 ,3
Expenditures on software:
in-house 89,5%
software houses 3,0
universities 3,8
foreigp supplier 0,9
Source: SEI, 1984.
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A market is also emerging for personal computers. From
150 to 200 thousand personal computers were sold in Brazil in
the last few years. Most are of the Timex type, costing be-
tween one and two hundred dollars; Apple and TRS clones also
exist. A survey among users of home-computers in the Sao Pau-
lo area showed that they are mainly young people (21% less than
19 years, 22% between 19 and 25, only 27% more than 36), and
mostly for videogames (33%). Other uses are: data banks and
accounting, 31%; word processing, 12%; graphics, 11%; domestic
chores, 15%; education, 15%. The average use is 14 hours a
week, as against 12 hours in the United States (Veja, December
19, 1984).
It should be noted that these are not necessarily
Brazilian-made computers: notwithstanding the government's ban,
smuggled micros are fairly easy to buy, and are openly adver-
tised in the newspapers. In fact, the main users of national
equipment are not home users or independent professionals, but
the financial and commercial sectors (table 2). On the whole,
the market is heavily biased towards large, institutional users,
and one can say that the micro-computer is still far from be-
coming an item of mass consumption in Brazil. IBM-PC alikes
now appearing are geared towards small and medium-sized firms.
Their price is high, they come already with expensive add-ons,
and are supposed to be operated by professionals in data pro-
cessing. Computer shops have not developed very much, and the
few computer magazines that exist tend to be loaded with tech-
nical jargon, difficult to understand and of little relevance
to the non-specialized user. There has been very little done
in terms of "user-friendly" software and equipment except what
is copied from Apple, and this expression, or its equivalent,
is still to appear in the Brazilian computer industry.
For specialists in hardware architecture or software
development, a protected market for their activity is considered
crucial. For users, either of large mainframes or of personal
equipment, what matters is price, reiability, good softwarej
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technical assistance and simplicity for the non-specialist, and
the Brazilian products.and firms are not necessarily the best
from this standpoint. 2 , On the other hand, internal supply of
software and equipment is a matter of concern for governmental
agencies not willing to depend on external norms, regulations,
and conveniences.
Manufacturers requiring electronic components in
their products are another important client and potential source
of difficulties. The recent history of Brazil's TV industry
is quite fresh in memory. A few years ago, there were several
Brazilian industries working with local technologies, located
mostly in Sao Paulo. Now they have been wiped out from the
market by firms working out of Manaus, up the Amazon River. Ma-
naus is a Free Zone which provides special favors - mostly fis-
cal exemptions and import privileges - for-.-moufaturers willing
to get established there. Its electronic industry produces vi-
deo-recorders, TV sets, electronic cameras, calculators, micro.-
wave ovens and just about all other consumer goods that rely
on imported electronic components. There is now a dispute be.-
tween SEI and the Manaus authorities for the establishment of
computer manufactures in the region. It is a conflict with re -
gional implications, since the national computer industry is
mostly located in Sao Paulo, while the Free Zone is basically
a mechanism to ,attract national and multinational industries
to the Amazon area.
Manufacturers of electric and electronic products
have their own association, the Associagao Brasileira de Indus-
tria E15tri-ca. e E-16tronics...- (Abinee) which includes Brazilian
and foreign firms, and is against any restriction on the inports
of electronic components (Brazilian manufacturers working under
's protection belong to Abicomp). There is also a very ac-
tive Sociedade de Usu rios de Computadores e Equipamentos Sub_-
sidiarios (Sucesu), which works as a lobby for users, 70% of
which have IBM equipment. Sucesu has about 1,800 firms affili7
ated, and its own estimate is that it covers 50% of the Brazil-
ian firms with computer installations or services.
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In the long run, what will happen with the Brazilian
computer policy will depend on its ability to respond reasona-
bly to these demar'ds, and to follow them as they change. If it
responds very slowly or inefficiently, the pressure will mount
to open the country still further to foreign firms and inported
equipment. Sucesu's president, Helio Azevedo, QeW a grddient
of interests going from scientists to industrialists, computer
professionals, users, and the population at large. For him,
the weight so far has been on the scientist;.' 'apd industrial-
ists' side. As the pendulum moves to other extreme, he predicts
a "copernican revolution" to happen in the Brazilian computer
environment. Much of what will happen will depend on the sec-
ond challenge PNI has to face, that is, research.
5. Second challenge: research
It is clear to all involved in PNI that it cannot be
sustained for long based only on SEI's authority and nationalist
ideals, if it cannot keep up with the technological challenges
of the field. The pressure for universalism - that is, free
market - will grotq almost irresistibly, opening the way for
foreign technology and companies. Early in 1985 an integrated,
three-year research plan in computer sciences was put forward
by the Sociedade Brasileira de Computagao and the Instituto de
Computagao of the Centro Tecnol6gico de Informitica. The plan
starts with the assertion that the national computer industry,
created by professionals coming from universities, is today
more advanced technologically than the university system, except
perhaps in a few basic areas. Its objective is to go beyond
the industry's current capabilities, and open the way for fur-
ther progress.
The plan provides a brief picture of the current stage
of university research in computer sciences (which does not in-
clude related fields such as electronics or automation). There
are five institutions providing doctoral degrees for 10 persons
a year (an average of 2 per institution). The total number of
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researchers with doctoral degrees is 108. There are also fifteen
institutions providing master's degrees, and a small flux or
people being trained abroad and returning to the country. On
average, 15 new doctors enter the field each year. The total
number of researchers is estimated at 750, 500 of whom work
on software. The research plan projects an increase in the to-
tal number of doctors to 500 by the end of 1987, as against 300
if the current growth rate is kept. For this, it will be ne-
cessary to create new doctoral programs and provide more fel-
lowships for studies abroad. Proportional increases in techni-
cal personnel, equipment, library facilities, etc., will also
be needed. The total cost for research projects, infrastruc
ture, interchange and follow-up is estimated to be around 40
million dollars in three years. This value is placed in conr
parison with figures of R&D expenditures in computer science
of developed countries: US$ 500m for the "5th generation pro-
ject" in Japan, 350 million pounds in five years in the United
Kingdom, US$ 220m a year for the "Esprit" program in the Euro-
pean Community, US$ 400m for the "Stars" program and US$ 50m a
year for the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corpora-
tion, both in the United States. The amount required by the
plan is quite small by international standards. However, Brazil
would not have the capacity to absorb a much larger sum, given
the current small basis of computer research. And even these
limited resources may be very difficult to get.
A list of high priority research fields as also drawn.
It includes the architecture of digital systems; time-sharing
systems; software engineering; data bases; CAD/CAM; artificial
intelligence; sign processing and pattern identification; mathe
matics applied to computing; and computer theory. In all, 65
projects were identified. The research plan can be understood
essentially as an aggregation of isolated projects, to which a
weak order of priorities was attached. The plan does not refer
to research done at the private sector, to the activities of
the Centro Tecnol6gico da Informatica, or to the contribution
of IBM to university research.
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The research effort in the private sector can only
be gauged by indirect figures. Brazilian computer firms employ
about ten times more people in R&D than the multinational ones
(1,177 against 121 in 1983), in spite of being smaller (these
figures can be inflated, however, since the concept of research
can easily be stretched when a company considers it convenient
to do so). Work is done in reverse engineering, software adap-
tation, and new developments. The number of employees with
higher education degrees per US$ 100m sold is almost twice in
the Brazilian firms (566 against 351), and more than ten times
in terms of R&D (171 vs. 15). There are no figures of R&D ex-
penditures in the private sector. If one assumed that 5% of
total sales go to R&D, this would give a figure of US$ 34m a
year in R&D in the national computer industry. This figure,
however, seems to be too high in terms of the available manpower.
The Centro Tecnol*gico da Informatica was established
in 1982 as part of SEI and transformed into the main sponsoring
agency for R&D in informatics in the country by the 1984 law.
In spite of its wide mandate, it is still a small outfit. It
has about 300 people in its staff, working in the outskirts of
the city of Campinas, Sao Paulo, divided among four institutes :
automation, computation, instrumentation and microelectronics.
It is not a purely research institution: it sells services to
the private sector, provides technical assistance and develops
joint projects with the universities. As SEI's technical branch,
it oversees the fu3fillment of nationalization tarets of IBM's
computer assembly plant nearby and seeks to T.tablish standards
and provide certifications for the national computer industry.
The Computing Institute is, among other things, en -
gaged in an ambitious program to develop a "software plant pro -
ject" which would, according to its leaders, be able to place
Brazil at the international frontier in terms of software de -
velopment. A "software plant" is supposed to be an environment
for software production endowed with an array of programming
tools and automation mechanisms allowing to go from the typical
3-6 lines an hour of software production to the 10-15 level,
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and with better reliability. The Microelectronics Institute is
basically concerned with technologies related with microchip
production. There is no attempt to compete internationally in
terms of large-scale integration. However, the kdea is that
there is room for the development of custom-oriented ICs, and
for some work to be done in all stages of IC production - pro-
ject elaboration, masks, diffusion, encapsulation and quality
control. One of the Instrumentation Institute's projects is
to develop mechanisms of digital information processing and
display which could be used with widely different sensors, thus
providing the scale for instruments production the Brazilian
market lacks. The Automation Institute works in the fields of
linear and digital automated processes, seeking constant involve-
ment with the industrial sector.
CTI's current budget is about US$ :Lif a year, and a
projected increase to US$ 3m is still to be approved. Its new
mandate requires a much larger budget, but there, is no assurance
that these resources will be forthcoming. CTI's general direc-
tor, Joss Rubens Doria Porto, was appointed as SEI's Secretario
by the Tancredo Neves government, which assures a central place
for CTI. However, the general policy of budgetary restraint
does not favor any dramatic increase of resources for this or
any other field in the near future, and, for the first time,
SEI willhave to dispute resources with other agencies within
the Ministry of Science and Technology.
IBM is a relatively new, but potentially heavy new-
comer to R&D support in Brazil. In the past, it.provided the
Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro with hardware and assis-
tance, helping it to become the first and probably the best
computer science department in the country. More recently, how-
ever, it did not match CDC's offer for a new mainframe to the
Catholic University, and lost that special relationship. Now,
according to an IBM spokesman, the company expects to provide
equipment and support to 18 among the best universities and
research centers in Brazil during the next four years, spending
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about 40 million dollars in equipment, software, technical as -
sistance and fellowships. The beneficiaries include the School
of Engineering of the State University of Sao Paulo, the Labo-
rat6rio de Computagao Cientifica of the National Research -Coun-
cil and the Federal Universities of Rio de Janeiro and Pernam-
buco. Other support activities from IBM include about 20 fel-
lowships for graduate students in the country and three for
post-graduate studies in IBM laboratories in the U.S. every
year; a Software Institute for teaching in software engineering;
a Latin American institute for system analysis (LASTRI) which
provide courses for IBM and non-IBM personnel; and a Scientific
Center in Brasilia with about 10 researchers at the doctoral
1el, working in applications in the fields of energy, admi-
nistration, economics and health, in association with Embrapa
(agricultural research), IPE (space research) and other insti-
tutions. IBM provides also technical assistance to Brazilian
suppliers to its factory in Campinas, which exports around
US$ 200m a year in equipment to many countries. 1 1
The Brazilian research effort is still very limited
in size, and will have to increase quite considerably if the
ambitions of PNI are to be met. Besides, tensions among these
different research programs and support lines are likely to hap-
pen. There is a dispute between CTI and several university de-
partments about their respective roles in R&D. For some depart-
ments, CTI is diverting resources from the universities, and
occupying fields which are not adequate for a governmental re-
search outfit. For CTI, university research institutes should
not provide services to industry, a role more prcperly performed
by CTI. CTI defines itself as a priviledged interface between
the universities and industry, a role resented by some univer-
sity departments.
The growing presence of IBM also generates tensions.
The research plan organized by CTI and SBC contemplates only
the incorporation of nationally produced hardware in the uni-
versitres, and it is clear that SEI does not appreciate the
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spreading of "IBM culture" and equipment. On the other hand,
university departments using computers as research and teaching
tools are quite happy to receive this support. It seems obvious
that IBM seeks to stimulate applications of computer equipment
in its own terms, therefore making itself indispensable. Changes
or improvements of computer plants in the universities have to
receive SEI's approval, which means that IBM's activities are
closely supervised and attrictions are bound to occur. At the
same time, there will be no match for IBM if she really goes
ahead with its plans to equip the universities at no cost.
6. Third challenge: politics
Whether SEI will be able to keep its authority, and
whether research money will be forthcoming to CTI and the uni-
versities, it all depends on politics. Bureaucratic insulation
is being challenged not only by external competition, pressures
from the users and the speed of technological inovations, but
also by the changing political climate which makes bureaucratic
insulation much more diffi,6ult to keep today than in the near
past.
The Bill institutionalizing PNI was send to Congress
by the Brazilian government in June, 1984.12 The text, among
other things, defined the general objectives of the new policy
established a National Council for Informatics and Automation
(Conin) and defined the scope and authority of the Secretaria
Especial de Informatica (SEI). SEI was empowered to examine in
advance all import requests for goods and services related to
informatics for 8 years. The law also authorized the creation
of a research agency, the Fundagao Centro Tecnologico para a
Informgtica - CTI and a special fund for informatics and auto-
mation.
Many things changed between the first text and the
version approved by Congress, which, throughout 1984, acquired
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increasing autonomy from the Executive. Originally, Cin anc
SEI were to remain under the National Security Council. In the
final version, Conin came directly under the President, side
by side with the Councils for Social and Economic Development,
the National Information Service (SNI), the Armed Forces High
Command (EMFA), and the National Security Council itself (in
comparison, the National Research Council remained within the
Ministry of Planning, in a much lower position). More signifi-
cantly, Conin and SEI were taken away from military jurisdic-
tion. Now the Secretaria de Informatica (SEI) was to be con -
trolled by a collegiate body, and placed under a non-specified
Minister. In the new government, this is the newly created Mi-
nistry of Science and Technology.
Further changes were introduced by the Executive,which
enacted the bill with a few vetoes on 'Qctobge29, 1984. On De -
cember 27 the President issued a "decree-law' changing some
items of the original text and three decrees regulating the
law's implementation. The vetoes killed two anendments made by
Congress dealing with protection of citizen's rights to privacy
and employment, as they could be affected by the new technu-
logies. Also, it eliminated a tax which would provide the
newly created fund for informatics with sizeable resources for
research and development. Finally, they left open the number
of members of Conin, a decision which was perceived as a door
to give it a majority of military officers. The decree-law
changed the original definition of "national companies" to in
clude those with open capital but with 70% of it (or 2/3 of the
voting shares) in hands of Brazilian residents, public corpora-
tions or companies. It also subjected any change of the con-
trol in these companies to governmental approval. The aim was
to make room for banks and other companies with publicly traded
stocks; one of its consequences is, of course, to open the door
for non-controling foreign capital.
The first decree has an extremely detailed definition
of Conin's attributions. Its mandate runs along 32 items, from
the elaboration of a National Plan for Informatics :am41 Automa-
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tion to the establishment of technical norms, control of inter-
national data transfers, evaluation of teaching programs for
professional training, creation of research centers in the coun-
try and abroad, aproval of projects of technological transfer
and of capital increases in companies. It has also a say in mat,
ters of import and export policies.
All this wide-range power is diluted, however, by
the way the Council is to be organized and run. Of its 22 mem-
bers, 14 are Ministers, 8 are chosen from lists presented by
interest groups related with informatics (users' associations,
computer companies, professional and scientific societies, etc.).
Even the Bar Association was contemplated, presumably for its
concern with the citizen's individual rights. This format not
only guarantees the government's control over Conin, but also
that its meetings will be made up mostly by the Ministers' de-
puties with usually no knowledge of the subjects under discus-
sion and no autonomous decision power. Besides, the Council is
supposed to meet only once every two months, and the members
are not allowed to request time to examine the documents under
discussion (article 5). Still more significantly, two presi-
dential vetoes (to article 7,111 and 8,V) limdted Conin's power
to make decisions, making it a predominantly normative and ad-
visory body and leaving all practical power to SEI. With this
structure, Conin is bound to become essentially a legitimizing
and rubber-stamp institution.
According to the second decree, SEI is supposed to
be subordinated to Conin and act as its executive agency. All
Conin's decisions are to be previously prepared by SEI; besides,
it keeps its role of analyzing and approving projects of devel-
opment and production of computer goods and a previous say on
all imports related with the computer industry for 8 years from
the approval of the law in 1984. SEI runs a special Fundo para
Atividades de Informatica (FAI), has financial and administra-
tive autonomy and is led by a powerful Secretirio with suppor-
ting staff and sub-.ecretaries. The Secretario is appointed
by the President upon recommendation of the Minister in charge
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of Conin.
The last decree approves the by-laws of the Fundagao
Centro Tecnol*gico de InformItica which was created by the law
as an outgrowth of the Centro Tecnol6gico de Informitica. The
Fundagao is to be a state-owned institution that runs according
to private law with wide autonomy to hire and dismiss person-
nel, set salaries and manage its own resources. CTI is entitled,
among other things, to create new entities in Brazil or abroad,
sign contracts with universities and research centers, and
take loans in the country or abroad. It has its own institutes
and a complex administrative structure run by a pedbident nomi-
nated by the President of the Republic. It does not report to
SEI's secretary, but directly to 'Coriin and to the Minister in
charge of informatics.
In many respects, these decrees are being interpreted
by observers as a last-minute attempt of the Figueiredo govern-
ment to reverse the intention ),ehind the changes introduced by
the Congress, aimed at reducing SEI's power by making it a
mere executive agency of Conini with limited policy-making au-
thority. According to this view, the support SEI received from
the Democratic Alliance (the political coalition which elected
Tancredo Neves) cannot 'be taken as an unqualified endorsement,
but resulted from a political understanding between Neves and
a more militant group in his own party which was reluctant to
agree with his election by an electoral college. Conin- was
meant to be transformed into a meeting ground for different
interest groups (including the different ministries in a coali-
tion government), which would reduce what was perceived as
SEI's one-sided commitment with national producers of computing
equipment.
It is still too early to say what will happen in the
new government. The presidential vetoes can be reversed by Con-
gress, and the new government can change the decrees. The nomi-
nation of Doria Porto as SEI's Secretary means that there will
be continuity with PNI's general philosophy. At the same time,
SEI 's placement under the newly created Ministry of Science and
Technology reduces its power and political access which is com-
pounded by the political weakness of the new Ministry, due to
problems related with th; illness. and final death of Tancredo
Neves. This Ministry is already flooded with pressures for
research money coming from all sectors, and clientelistic de-
mands are bound to increase, while money is expected to remain
short for everybody. External pressures are also likely to
increase. Brazil will have to negotiate its debt with foreign
creditors, who in the past have used the opportunity to press
against the computer market protection, and can be expected to
do it again.
7. Prospects: the birth of an industry or a "technological
window"?
The official and more commonly held justification of
PNI is that this is a necessary stage in the beginning of any
self-sustained industrial development. According to this rea-
soning, national industries should be protected for some time
from external, more mature competition, while they gather
strength. The Brazilian history of import substitution in the
industrial sector is said to confirm this. There is certainly
a learning process expressed by the increasing sophistication,
nationalization and low cost of the computer equipment being
produced by national companies. It should be noted, however,
that this is the first time in the country's history that a
segment of the private industry is closed to foreign conpanies,
either alone or in association with Brazilian fit"*. All previ-
ous experiences of market protection were aimed at Brazilian-
made products (such as cars, appliances, and other electric
products), not companies, except in state-controlled areas such
as oil or telecomunications. In this sense, the arrent policy
for computers is not comparable with previous experiences.
It is possible to argue, moreover, that what appears
to be the initital stage of an emerging national industry is
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in fact just a "technological window" .eged by the microcoirputer
revolution of the last few years, which is already coming to
an end. The Brazilian computer industry relies on integrated
circuits which are imported or produced locally by subsidiaries
of multinational corporations. So far, it has been possible
to produce reasonable clones of the Apple, TRS and even IBM
PCs, thvough reverse engineering and the use of components avai-
lable t international market. Prices of Brazilian microcom-
puters are falling rapidly for 8-bit models, coming close to
the international levels (this is not true, however, either
for the IBM-PC compatibles or for peripherals such as monitors,
disc-drives and printers). If, however, computers such as the
Apple's Macintosh, based on dedicated and proprietary chips,
represent the trend, the same pattern of imitation is ccnsidered
impossible to maintain.
But who needs Macintosh? It has been argued that
the Brazilian computer industry should not seek to emulate the
American or Japanese patterns, but address itself to the coun-
try's actual needs. New products such as Macintosh respond to
the conditions of competition of the American market, and not
necessarily to an existing demand or need. Seen from this
light, the technological gap, although impossible to overcome,
is not necessarily a reason to condemn the current policy of
national self-reliance. There is, of course, an alternative
reasoning, which is the notion that Macintosh represents the
first major step of the computer industry into the mass consump-
tion market, because of the direct access it provides to the
non-professional user. If this islfrue, the consequences will
be serious for a country which decides to stay away from this
type oft rans formation.
What makes this question more complicated is, of
course, how to define what the "national needs" are. In some
areas, such as telecomunications, the "national need" has been
defined as the interlinkage of all regions of tle country, and
of the country with the world, through the most effective mans,
from telephones to satellites. This demand comes in part from
.31
large users of communication facilities, such as the TV net-
works, and in part from the drive of state-owned corporations
working in the field, like Embratel. In this area, there is a
clear tendency to utilize only state-of-the-art technologies,
and an obvious impatience with the limitations brought about
by the current policy.
In other fields, such as banking, the need seems to
be defined mostly by competition between firms. Brazil does
not "need" 24-hour automatic tellers, or on-line services in
the banks. In other countries, automatization of the banking
system is essentially a labor-saving device. Given 'the low sa-
laries paid in Brazil, and the high costs of the new technolo-
gies and its instalation, it is doubtful that the motivation
in Brazil is the same. Although it is clear that with the new
technology changes in this labor force are bound to occur,
with new skills becoming more important and others turning ob-
solete, this seems to be a consequence, rather than the reason
for the changes. 1 4 Besides competition, the bank's entrance in
the computer industry represents for them an important and pro-
fitable diversification.
For SEI's new secretary, the current policy is irre-
versible, in spite of eventual adjustments. There are already
too many interests involved, and great awareness of its need.
He believes that the notion that there is an increasing techno-
logical gap between Brazil and other countries is mostly a
myth. He gives as an example the fact that the basic architec-
ture and operational systems of large mainframes have not
changed for many years, in spite of the development in chip in-
tegration. This stability is explained by the amount of capi-
tal and knowledge invested in.established technologies which
would be too costly to replace.15 Since Brazil did not make,
this previous investments, it could jump stages and work at
the frontier. Brazil cannot compete in the market of highly
integrated, mass produced chips, and could not work with too
specialized products for small markets. Because of the coun-
try's size, however, there should be places for products of in-
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termediate scale, for which there would be special comparative
advantages. To find these advantages, or the "niches" the na-
tional companies could occupy, should be the basis of the whole
policy. Examples would be "software plant project", the devel-
opment of pace-makers for carriers of Chagas disease and a
whole array of custom-made chips for medium-size markets, where
large economies of scale are not feasible.
This policy can have its drawbacks. It excludes the
two extremes of the computer market, the one dominated by
mainframes and the large public which will eventually move
into the massive utilization of microcomputers. For the former,
access to international technology is open, and will probably
continue to be so. Arrangements can also be made with local
universities and research institutes to meet their needs. For
the latter, however, the situation is more difficult. The
problem is not just the availability and price of microcom-
puters, but the whole development of a user-oriented computer
industry which is expanding so quickly in the advanced coun-
tries, but is badly lagging behind in Brazil. As this industry
reaches the educational systems and the daily activities of
small firms and independent professionals, there will be an
increasing gap, not just towards foreign technology, but towiards
the whole computer culture that is emerging in the developed
countries.
It is clear that the people responsible for PNI are
not simple-minded nationalists determined to "reinvent the wheel".
They may even talk, eventually, about "liberation technology"
(after the famous Liberation Theology preached by many sectors
of the Latin American Church) but are in fact looking for the
special niches and opportunities the Brazilian computer indus-
try and society can hope to occupy. The market reserve for mi-
crocomputers is only part of the whole strategy, which includes
also a wide range of associations between Brazilian and foreign
companies willing to si- n their technologies with its local
counterparts. They were-able to bring the question of cctputers
and their utilization to the forefront, to develop national
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competence and stimulate the large- ultinational corporations
to behave in a way they would probably not have done otherwise.
Because of this policy, and because there are now sophisticated
counterparts in Brazil, they are willing to talk about joint
ventures, technological transfer, open technologies. Even IBM,
which does not accept joint ventures, is competing for space
in more positive (or at least more subtle) ways, through support
to universities and technical assistance to local suppliers.
In all probability, PNI is not just a "window" opened
with the Sinclair and Apple clones, to be closed with Macintosh.
Given enough time and resources, Brazil will be able to build
enough competence to attend to significant parts of its inter-
nal market, to find products it can export, to protect its lo-
cal industry from foreign dumping and to reach reasonable stand-
ards of coexistence with international firms and international
trends. There is, however, a race with time. Bureaucratic insu
lation can easely get sour: isolation can breed incompetence -
And political clientelism, in a context of economic recession,
can rapidly dismantle R&D capabilities built up through many
years. Brazil is an open society, its integration with the in-
ternational economy and culture is irreversible, and there
will be increasing pressures from users not to be kept behind
by inferior technologies, bad service, customs controls and
industrial prilvileges. These pressures will certainly be
stimulated by foreign competitors, all too willing to demons-
trate their presumed superiority and offer their services.
In order not to lose this race, investments in R&D
and computer education in Brazil will have to iae quite
significantly, a bigger effort to look at the computer industry
from the user's point of view will have to be made, and a so-
phisticated view of the niches the Brazilian industries can
occupy,in this complex and increasingly internationalized sec-
tor, will have to be kept at all times. It is possible to pre-
dict that, when the fad of computer games is over (as it is
already in the United States and Europe) the future of the mi-
!crcomputer.'sector will depend on the Brazilian capacity to coM-
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pete with the applications and "friendliness" which is being
developed elsewhere. An important switch will have to be made
from the producer's to the individual user's point of view. a
change which is not nearly in sight. At the other extrene, Bra-
zil is likely to continue to import large, sophisticated equip-
ment for a long time. But, as the computer technology develops,
the distinctions between "mini", "mid-size" and large conputers
tend to get blurred, and associations between Brazilian and
foreign companies willing to share their technology will tend
to increase. One can expect that, given appropriate support,
these joint ventures will eventually branch out to both extre-
mes of the computer industry, without necessarily destroying
the purely national sector which is being developed under the
umbrella of market protection.
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*
This paper benefited from conversations held with People at thc
Centro Tecnol6gico de Informatica, Sucesu, IBM cof-Brasil, ana
other knowledgeable participants of the current deveegJyments
in the computer field in Brazil. None of them are responsible
for my understanding of what they said. I am grateful to Pro -
fessor Peter H. Smith, Department of Political Science, M.I.T. ,
for the invitation to write this text aad present it at the
Seminar. I am also indebted to Alexandre Barros, Claudio Mou-
ra Castro, and Joao Batista Araujo e Oliveira for criticizing
a first version of this paper.
1
"Informatics" (as in French, "informatique") is the standard
word utilized in Brazil to cover the whole field of conputing,
microelectronics, automation, etc.
It was not by chance that Lobato was from the state of Sao Pau -
lo,the country's more dynamic economic center, while his oppo-
nents at the National Department of Mineral Production were
mostly from Minas Gerais, a state with a weak private economy
but a well reputed, and quite traditional, School of Mines.
See Schwartzman and Castro, 1985, and Carvalho, 1979.
3 I will take for granted, throughout this text, that it is pre -
ferable to have the whole computer industry's productive cycle
in the country than to rely only on imported equipment based
on unknown "black boxes". There are enough economic, political
and cultural arguments for this preference which need not be
repeated here. The problems to be analyzed are not related to
its-desirability, but to its feasibility and costs.
4
The example of COPPE, the graduate engineering program of the
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro is striking. Its ambition
was to cover the full range of modern technologies, including
nuclear, chemical, electronic and naval engineering. However
successful it has been in comparison with other engineering
schools in Latin America, it soon became clear to COPPE lead-
ers that they had become much more competent than what the
country's industry could absorb. Cf. Nunes, Silva and Schwar-
tzman, 1982. At the opposite end, agricultural researchers
like to emphasize the economic returns of their work, in
terms of yields and profits generated by new technologies.
5 The involvement of the scientific community with the computer
policy should be seen in contrast with its alienation towards
the Brazilian nuclear program, which is exactly the opposite
to what happened in Argentina. These parallels are made explicit
by Adler, 1985.
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6 ITA's presence is particularly significant. It was organized in
the :Frties as an engineering school run by the Brazilian Air
Force and became the country's leading engineering school, open
to civilians through nationwide entrance examinations. Around
ITA developed the Sao Jose dos Campos industrial and technolo-
gical complex, where the country's most sophisticated techno-
logical institutions are located, including the Instituto de
Pesquisas Espaciais, Embraer and many private companies. ITA's
alunni also helped to build in the University of Campinas one
of the best physics department in the country.
7 Cobrat capital was formed with resources from state coupanies
Serpr6, Banco do Brazil, Caixa Econ~mica Federal, BNDE and
Digibrgs (56%), a pool of national private banks (39%), and
EE Equi.pamentos Eletr6nicos (Brazilian) and Ferranti (English)
with the last 5%. (Cf. Tigre, 1982, p. 114-5). A full account
of Cobra's history is given in a forthcoming book by R. Rama-
murti (1985).
8 Working under secrecy, Prclogo is an extreme case of bureau-
cratic insulation, and there is no way to assess whether its
claims of efficiency and self-sufficiency are correct. Based
on experiences of other secretive operations in Brazil, one
would usually expect the opposite (I am grateful to Alexandre
Barros to calling attention to this point).
9 In fact, complaints about the lack of technical assistance and
support are widespread among users of Brazilian equipment,
which explains the preference enjoyed among large users for
IBM.
1 0 The establishment of microcomputer manufacturers in Manaus can
force all other firms to move there to remain conpetitive. The
free trade zone authority, Suframa, is not committed to poli-
cies of technological transfer, and this can press the nation-
al industries there to give preference to imported, rather
than to nationally produced components, exactly as it happened
with the TV industry and sound equipment industries.
1 1 The participation of Brazilian employees and suppliers in its
Campinas factory is a big item of IBM institutional publicity
in Brazil. However, there is no publicity about its support
for R&D, for cautionary or some other unknown reason.
12According to the country's authoritarian constitution still
in place, a bill coming from the Executive has to be voted by
Congress within a pre-defined period, or it is automatically
enacted.
1 3
"Decree laws", another instrument of authoritarian power.
Through them, the President can legislate by decree and "ad
referendum" from Congress, which has 90 days and needs a ma-
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jority of 2/3 to reject them. The current Brazilian goverment
has decided not to make use of Decree Laws before they are
banned by the country's future constitution, as it is expected.
14One explanation for the rapid entrance of Brazilian banks into
automation are the profits derived from the speed of electro-
nic funds transfers, which allow the banks to remain longer
with the costumer's resources and maximize their allocation.
Another consequence of the current trend is the concentration
of Brazil's banking system, with the elimination of those
which cannot keep up with the automation race.
1 5 In that sense, and contrary to the common understanding, mi-
croelectronics and computing would be "mature technologies",
like steel production or -harmaeutics before the introduction
of genetics engineering.
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VARIETIES OF NATIONALISM:
THE POLITICS OF THE BRAZILIAN COMPUTER INDUSTRY*
Peter Evans
As Professor Simon Schwartzman has made clear, while technological
and technical factors are of course important in the evolution of the
Brazilian computer industry, politics have been central. Without the
convergence of a variety of nationalist policies or a variety of
nationalisms, there would be no indigenous computer industry in Brazil.
Therefore, in order to understand the Brazilian computer industry, we
must analyze these nationalist politics in some detail.
This is not to say that nationalist politics are the only kind of
politics involved in the computer industry. Obviously, as it was brought
out in the discussion of Professor Schwartzman's paper, there are other
political questions that are equally important, and, some might argue in
the long run, even more important. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the
P.M.D.B. divide computer politics into the national question on the one
hand and the democratic question on the other. The democratic question
has to do with the implications of new informatics technology for the
decentralization or the centralization of the control of information:
Will information or information processing be an instrument of liberation
or oppression?
* Talk presented at the M.I.T. Symposium on "The Computer Question in
Brazil," Cambridge, Mass., April 16, 1985.
2There is also of course the distributional politics of computers,
whether robotics and automation will result in the marginalization of an
increasing proportion of the Brazilian labor force. I think these
questions are very important, but I am not going to discuss them here. I
mention them to alert you to the fact that they are left out of my
presentation. Instead, I will concentrate on the "national question."
In order to understand either the current policy or to speculate as
to the future evolution of informatics in Brazil, we have to examine the
nature of nationalism as applied to informatics. I think that the
special nature of nationalism in inforratics is nicely summarized in
Article 12 of the new law that was passed in October 1984. Article 12
defines a national firm in terms of three kinds of controls: control of
decision making, that is to say that the decision-making centers of the
firm are supposed to be located in Brazil; control of capital, or who
owns the equity, which is of course the traditional definition of a
national firm; and control of technology, that is to say, to be a
national firm under the new national informatics law, the firm must in
theory have the capacity to generate its own technology. Now, this is a
relatively unusual definition of what constitutes a national firm, both
traditionally in terms of Brazilian history as well as internationally.
It brings out, I think, the rather special nature of nationalism as it
has been applied to the informatics sector.
So let us step back for a minute and look at other varieties of
nationalism, some of which are involved in the informatics sector, some
of which have been important in the past, and others which I think are
going to become nore important in the future.
3A policy that is "economically nationalist" can take a variety of
forms. One we night call "security nationalisn," that is to say, putting
under national control those industries which have to do with national
defense or which are considered central to national security. This is a
nationalism that is very sectorially restricted, although it might be
quite embracing in terms of the expansiveness of the control desired
within those sectors. Security nationalism was obviously very important
in the origins of the informatics policy. The fact that informatics was
defined by key groups within the military as an issue of national
security was essential to the origin of the industry.
More traditional in Brazilian history is what we might call a
"developmental nationalism," that is to say, a nationalism which defines
the national interest in terms of the geographic location of the process
of production itself. The auto industry is a prime example of this
developmental nationalism in action. The implantation of the auto
industry was considered a victory for nationalism in its era because it
internalized value added within Brazil and it moved the location of
production within Brazil's geographic boundaries. But this kind of
nationalism did not put the production under the control of the capital,
to say nothing of involving the requirement of indigenously developed
technology. It is important to remember then that one can have a
nationalist policy which involves simply locating production
geographically within Brazil. It is therefore possible to redefine
nationalism in a way quite different from the way in which it has been
defined in the informatics industry, as involving, for example, the
implantation of wholly owned TNC subsidiaries in Brazil.
4Assuming that nationalism involves local capital control, we have
what we might call "pecuniary nationalism," that is to say, a nationalism
which sees the national interest as lying primarily in the allocation of
a certain proportion of the flow of capital generated by a productive
industry to national capital or to the local industrial bourgeoisie.
If we look at other examples of nationalism in Brazil, we can find
pecuniary nationalism, that is to say, a nationalism which defines the
nationalization of the industry in terms of the flow of capital in
addition to the geographic location of production. Indeed, we can find
an example quite close to informatics. Brazil has embarked on a
nationalist policy in telecommunications, but that nationalist policy
involves the requirement that foreign capital share capital flows and
share equity participation with local capital. It does not generally
involve the requirement that those firms use or develop indigenously
their own technology (though of course indigenously developed technology
has emerged in some cases). Nationalism in telecommunications has been
defined in terms of pecuniary national interests in addition to some
degree of security interests, and in addition clearly to the sort of
developmental nationalist interests of geographic location. But it has
not been defined in terms of what characterizes most uniquely the
informatics sector, that is, a kind of "technological nationalism," which
says that the national interest is served insofar as indigenous capacity
to develop technology is generated by the policy.
Why should it be the case that technological nationalism emerged in
the informatics sector? I would argue that that association between
5informatics and technological nationalism has to do not simply with the
economic or technological features of the industry, but with the
particular kinds of alliances that lie behind the current policy. As
Professor Schwartzman has pointed out, these alliances were developed
primarily within the state apparatus. People like Ricardo Saur, who has
been labeled by one North American student of the informatics industry as
an "ideological guerilla" operating within the state apparatus, were
extremely important in creating this alliance. They were able to create
a sense of shared interest with powerful figures or powerful interests
within the military and the security apparatus at various times. But,
this was not principally an alliance of capitalists or people with
pecuniary interests in the computer industry; rather it was an alliance
of technologists, or technicos, and people within the state apparatus.
Understanding that social structural base of the original alliance is to
understand the reason for the way in which nationalism has been defined
in the industry. It is because of that peculiar base and the special
definition of nationalism that Brazilian policy has come to be viewed as
a very special example of economic nationalism and as a possible exemplar
for other countries.
At the same time, it is very important to point out, as Professor
Schwartzman's talk indicates, that while this policy is unquestionably an
economically nationalist policy, and while the economic nationalism that
is embodied in it is essential to the policy and essential in
understanding the development of the Brazilian industry, it is at the
same time a highly international policy in practice.
6Brazil's computer policy is not only internationalist in that it
presumes that local producers of small computers will continue to rely on
imported microprocessors and that it allows 100 percent foreign-owned
subsidiaries to dominate the mainframe market. It is also
internationalist in that it has fostered some very interesting joint
ventures and licensing agreements between foreign and local companies
producing "mini" computers. Outstanding among these is perhaps the
licensing of the DEC Vax-ll, a uniquely successful example of bargaining
in an internationalist vein made possible by a nationalist policy.
Brazilian computer policy is, in short, a very complex blend of
nationalist and internationalist elements and its success depends on that.
Having recognized its internationalist side, it is still worthwhile
to probe the peculiar kinds of nationalism that are involved in Brazil 's
informatics policy. First, it is important to realize that once the
policy emerged, its success depended on the construction of new alliances
quite different from those which originally lay behind it. The
possibility of those new alliances was generated in part by the policy
itself. Most obviously, the policy created the possibility of national
capital in computers. National capital then became a new ally, a new
actor in the definition in the nationalism that lay behind the
informatics policy. In part because of this new actor and in part
because of the activity of the earlier actors -- above all technicos, the
nationalist policy that was generated in the mid-70s was also able to
enlist yet another kind of national ally -- people who were basically
political nationalists in the traditional anti-imperialist sense or in
the traditional more global national interest sense. Of principal
7importance here are politicians like Christina Carvates and Severo Gomes,
who had a general ideological interest in nationalism but were not
particularly involved in the sector itself. The enlistment of such
people was essential to the passage of the 1984 law. In other words, it
was an expansion of that nationalist alliance from something that existed
inside the state apparatus, and, in particular, in an insulated part of
the state apparatus, to a broader sort of alliance that made possible the
sustenance of the policy.
Until 1984, the expansion of that alliance did not, however, involve
fundamental redefinitions of the earlier project that had been
essentially defined within the state apparatus, principally by technicos,
but also by people involved on the basis of security interests. However,
if we look at the Brazilian computer industry in 1984 and try to predict
what kind of nationalism is likely for the future, I would argue that we
must look at what kinds of capital are involved in the industry and at
the interests of that capital and ask how is that capital likely to
choose among the variety of nationalisms that are available.
First of all, where is an important segment of capital involved in
the industry which flows directly out of the same kinds of interests that
originated the industry, firms whose position in the market is based
primarily on their indigenous technological prowess. These are firms who
came into the industry with almost no financial capital but whose
founders had technological abilities and were able to transform these
skills into important positions within the industry.
8One of the outstanding examples of that kind of firm is a firm called
"Scopus," whose founders came out of the University of Sao Paulo. In
Rio, an example is EBC, which is again a firm essentially created by
university people operating with very small amounts of money at least in
the beginning. Both firms depend on their technological prowess for
their survival and depend on the exclusion of competing foreign
technology from the Brazilian market for the maintenance of their current
positions. Scopus and EBC would be in trouble if it were possible
indiscriminately to license foreign technology. Foreign partners are
looking for local economic strength; by definition they do not need the
kind of technological prowess that is located in those firms since
technology is what they are licensing. Therefore, it is those firms that
have been the strongest lobby behind the inclusion of local capacity to
generate technology in the definition of national capital in the new
informatics law. Edson Fregni, who is the president of ABICOMP, the
Brazilian Computer Association, is also the president of Scopus, and in
general this kind of capital has been tremendously important in
sustaining a definition of nationalisn in informatics that includes
"technological nationalism."
Another important kind of capital in the industry, again at the lower
end of the market, firms making TRS-80 or Sinclair emulations, firms like
Prologica and Microdigital, also have a powerful interest in the
exclusion of indiscriminate licensing of foreign technology because their
success depends on the fact that the foreign originators of this
technology can neither enter the market themselves nor freely choose
local allies to represent them. These firms are different from the
9previous kind of firms in the degree to which they generate technology
locally but they also have a powerful interest in the maintenance of a
technological definition of nationalism.
As computers have become more clearly a growth industry, the earlier
more technically oriented participants have been complemented by a
different kind of firm, companies whose principal "comparative advantage"
lies in their financial strength rather than their technical know-how.
These companies are much more likely to be able to benefit from a
pecuniary definition of nationalism and might even benefit from a
relaxing of the emphasis on "technological national ism." The purest
example of capital that became involved in the industry as financial
capital, Brasil invest, has unfortunately collapsed for reasons related to
its role in informatics. But there are other participants, which
although they may have to varying degrees interest in local technology,
must count financial strength as their principal basis for entry.
Brazil 's two biggest banks, Bradesco and Itau/, are prime examples. These
big banks would be attractive partners for high-technology TNCs even in
the absence of restrictions on the inflow of foreign technology. Such
restrictions may provide potentially useful bargaining chips in
negotiations with TNCs even for these firms, but they can afford to be
much more flexible than technologically oriented capital.
The spl i t between "technologi cal capi tal" and "financial capi tal"
seemed clear in the spring of 1984 when technological capital strongly
opposed the licensing of foreign "super-mini" technology, arguing that
Brazilian firms would soon be able to develop "super-micros" to fill
mid-range user needs. At least some members of this group saw the
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licensing as an abandonment of technological nationalism. On the other
hand, both of the major banks were involved in proposals for licensing
foreign technology. (Bradesco, for example, was a major participant in
the group that licensed the DEC Vax-ll.) Technological capital lost this
round and licensing was allowed. Whether this is a harbinger for the
future is unclear, but what is clear is that as a wider range of private
capital becomes involved in the industry, there is bound to be more
diversity in the ways in which that capital defines its interests.
The other actors that have become increasingly important in the
industry, which leads again to a strong pressure for the redefinition of
nationalism, are users. Computer users have different interests than
producers. So far, the sort of blend of nationalism and internationalism
that is embodied in the current policy has been sufficient to avoid user
pressure that might undercut technological nationalism. But, it is
interesting to note that the traditional names in Brazilian industrial
capital -- Votorantim, Villares, Bardella, etc. -- are not directly
involved in the industry as producers. Instead, they relate to it as
users. So far it appears that their interest in obtaining foreign
technology like industrial process controls has been served by the
internationalist side of the policy. It has been possible to create some
joint ventures in that area and it has been possible to import the
technology that they need.
But, as the Brazilian policy succeeds in generating more use of
computers, user interests will become still more important. Insofar as
they do, a definition of nationalism which stresses the efficiency of the
national economy rather than providing local capital with the possibility
11
of capital flows from the production of computers or maximizing the
generation of indigenous technology becomes more possible. In short, an
"economic efficiency" definition of nationalism may emerge out of the
users and begin to contest the current technological definition.
What I am arguing overall is that to understand the definition of
nationalism one has to look at the particular alliance that lies behind
the construction of the policy. But, the very success of the policy
itself generates a different set of social structures, generates new
actors with different interests. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that
the policy will maintain its present form, simply because the
social-structural underpinnings of the nationalism that created it have
changed. If one looks at the changes in those social-structural
underpinnings, the prediction must be that there will be a move toward an
increasing amount of alliance between national capital, defined in terms
of equity ownership, and transnational capital.
Already last year, there were strong rumors that Itau and IBM had
been negotiating a possible joint venture. This of course illustrates
the other thing that changes when this policy succeeds. The attitudes of
transnational capital tend to move in response to the existence of that
nationalism, which contributes to the likelihood of alliances. In
addition to the possibility of joint ventures between existing
participants like IBM and local capital in the industry, there are also
of course possibilities of bringing new interests into the industry,
people who are not as deeply involved in the industrialization of Brazil
as they could be, like Fujitsu or AT&T. The construction of increasing
transnational alliances would both provide new opportunities for
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pecuniarily defined nationalism for strong finance capital groups within
Brazil and also would respond to the interests of users by increasing the
number of participants in the industry.
Even if alliances with transnational capital increase, however, one
should not see this as a victory of dependence, a return to the status
quo, or a sign that the Brazilian policy was a "flash in the pan."
Whatever new kinds of internationalism might emerge within the Brazilian
industry, they will never replicate the situation which would have
occurred if IBM and other TNCs had been allowed to develop the small
computer narket by themselves. Whatever new sets of policy lines emerge
will start from a very different place than they would have started from
in 1977. Again, precisely because of the social structures created by
the old policy, any new internationalism will confront a very different
situation and will therefore have a very different character than it
would have had in the absence of these previous policies. The heritage
of technological nationalism has changed the situation even if it becomes
redefined, the new situation will never involve the degree of
transnational domination that might have occurred in the absence of the
previous policy.
PERFORMANCE AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE BRAZILIAN COMPUTER INDUSTRYt/
Paul Iasto:; Tigre **
The promotion of an indigenous computer industry i n Bra-
zil depended on the imposition of protectionist barriers against
imports and local manufacturing by multinational firms. This
policy was defended on the grounds that infant industries rould
not compete directly with established manufacturers. Policy makers
argued that the costs of protection would be compensated in the
long run, if firms acquire technical capabilities to design,
develop and manufacture up-dated product.; at competitive prices.
It has been argued, however, that computer users in Brazil
are paying too much for their equipment. One of the main arquments
against the policy is that computers are typically an input into
other industries so that protection of locally manufactured
equipment could impose a tax in the form of higher input prices
on the rest of the industrial sector.
The aim of this paper is to assess the evolution of the
price competitiveness of locally manufactured microcomputers, both
Brazilian-owned and subsidiaries of multinational firms, and to
compare them to American prices. It tinLends to provide empirical
evidence towards a better understanding (f the technology learning
process in the computer industry.
In Brazil there are more than 30 mirrocomputer manufacturers.
* Paper prepared for the M.I.T. Symposium on "The Computer Question in
Brazil," Cambridge, Mass., April 16, 1985. Based on P.B. Tigre
and L. Perine, "Competitividade dos Computadores Nacionais," IEI/
UFRJ, November 1984.
** Instituto de Economia Industrial da Universidade Federal do Rio de
Janeiro.
2Although some firms like Cobra, Itautec and SID designed original
products, most manufacturers have reverse-engineered the world
best-seller microcomputers. This paper analyses the price evolu-
tion and competitiveness of Brazilian clones of the Apple II and
TRS-80 and the HP-85 manufactured in Brazil by a subsidiary of
the Hewlett-Packard Corp.
The microcomputer Apple II is considered one of the most
successful products in the history of computers. Worldwide sales
climbed from 2,500 units in 1977 to 1,000,000 in 1984. It was
designed under a conception of open architecture both in hardware
and software, utilizing the Motorola 6502 microchip and the DOS
operational system. Consequently, the Apple II was widely copied
by firms from various countries. Some of the so-called Apple-clones
such as the ACE micro of Franklin Computers are considered to be
improvements on the original equipment.
Another strategy pursued mainly by East Asian manufacturers
is to be price-competitive rather than to compete in quality and
performance. Apple-clones like AP II manufacturcd by Computer A&T
and the Micro Il Computer are sold in the USA at half the price
of the original Apple II. Such a low price is due to the importa-
tion of kits and sub-assemblies from Asian dut. free zones wbere
products are manufactured for export with the oenefit of tax
levies and low labour costs.
In Brazil, the Apple II became very popular despite the
legal ban on the imports of microcomputers. In 1983, according to
different estimates, there were more than 10,000 imported units
installed locally. Local manufacturing was introduced in 1982 by
Spectrum, followed by Unitron and Polymax. By the end of 1984
there were about 15 local firms manufacturihng Apple clones in
3Brazil (See Table 1).
TABLE 1 - Apple II - Compatible manufacturers in Brazil
Manuf acturer MOdl Memory Cap. Tntroduct ion(W-K13YTES)
Apple-Tronic
C.C.E.
Dismac(**)
D.M.Eletr6nica
Magnex
Microdigital
Micronix
Micronix (**)
Milmar (**)
Polymax
Spectrum
Spectrum(*)
Unitron
Victor do Br. (**)
U6502
Exato
D8100
INII
Manager II
TK2000 (Color)
Dactron
Dactron E
AP II-Plus
Maxxy
Microengenho I
Microengenho II
AP. II
Elpa II Plus
48
48
48
48
64
64
48
64
48
48
48
64
48
48
1983
1983
1982
] 982(l Apple in Brazil)
1982
1983
Source: lIevista INFO - Direct data Collection.
(*) Similar to AP.IIE
(**) Siilar to AP.II Plus.
Tandy/Radio Shack, the manufacturer of TRS-80, is one of the
oldest names in the world microcompuler market. Along with Apple
and Commodore, it practically invented the iicros and established
a technical standard followed by iany now fitmn. Among its best
known American clones makers are Microcomputer Technologies, LNW
Computers and American Computers. They usually sell TRS 80 look-alike
4micros at lower prices than Tandy itself.
In Brazil many firms have reverse engineered the various
models of the TRS-80, working from the Z-80A microprocessor
supplied by Zilog. The best known manufacturer is Prologica which
became Brazil's market leader with the CP 500 model. introduced in
March 1982. It was followed by Sysdata, Digitus, Milmar, Jamper
and Kemitron. Table 2 shows the Brazilian TRS-80 compatible
manufacturers.
TABLE 2 - TRS 80 - Compatible manufacturers in LIrazil
Manufacturer Equipment serational Processor Memory IntroductionSystem
Digitus DGP-1000 DOS e CP/M Z80A 64K 83
Janper JP-0l DOS " 16K
Jamper JP-02 DOS " 48K
Kemition NAJA DOS e CP/M " 64K
Milmar TRS-80 DOS e CP/N " 48K
Prol6gica CP-300 DOS " 48K ABR./83
Prol6gica CP-500 DOS e CP/M " 48K MAR. /82
Sysdata JR.I DOS " 16K ABR./83
Sysdata JR.II DOS " 48K 84
Source: INFO, n9 18, Julho 1984.
Hewlett-Packard is the only foreign-owned firm authorized
to manufacture microcomputers in Brazil. It was given permission
to sell desk-top microcomputers for scientific and technical
applications, since these involve sophisticated software technology
not available locally. The HP 85 cannot be easily copied because
it was designed around a chip which is exclusive to Hewlett-Packard
itself. It also uses an operational system (HP Basic) developed
5in-house and not compatible with other firms' hardware.
Measures of Competitiveness
There are two approaches to the question of competitiveness:
the first is to compare the price difference between equipment
manufactured locally and overseas. The second is to compare
performance and technology up-dating.
As far as prices are concerned, I have found in recent
research that there has been an
impressive improvement in the price competitiveness of locally
manufactured microcomputers. In 1982 when Unitron, the best seller
Brazilian Apple clone, was launched, the relation between the CPU
price in Brazil and in the USA was 2:1 ($3,295 against $1,530,
see Figure 1). Since then the price in Brazil has been falling
steadily and at a comparatively higher it e than in the USA.
In May 1984 the CPU price became equal in both countries. During
that period, the dealers' price in the USA fell 34.7% while
in Brazil it corresponded to 70%. Another Apple-like microcomputer
- Polymax - had the price difference reduced from 163% in November
1982 to less than 8% in May 1984.
In 1982, when the Brazilian.Apple-like microcomputers
were initially introduced, they were clearly not price-competitive
with the original equipment bought in illegally. Dealers offered
imported equipment at only 50% above the American price, converted
into cruzeiros at the black market exchange rate (from 15% to 30%
over the official rate). Most corporations, though, for legal and
guarantee reasons, preferred to buy from local manufacturers.
6FIGURE 1 - Evolution of the CPU price of Unitron in Brazil and
Apple II / IIe in the US.
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However, the market for personal use was mainly supplied by
American equipment. One year later, the prices of imported and
locally manufactured equipment were in Ievel terms, due to the
devaluation of the cruzeiro and cost reductions in local manufac-
turing. In May 1984 the illegal imports were restricted to floppy
disk drives and printers.
Table 3 and Figure 2 provide further the relative prices
of Apple-like microcomputers manufactured in Brazil as compared
to the original equipment in the American market. Brazilian Apple-
clones are, on average, 36.6% more expensive. Such difference is
mainly due to the price of floppy disk drives (125% more) and
video display units (283% more). In CPU terms the average price
difference is only 8.2%.
7TABLE 3 - Comparative prices of the Apple IIe in the USA and
Brazilian-made Apple clones. May 1984. US dollars
EQUIPNENT CPU (64K) 1 DISK IOIITOR INIERFACE COJMPLLTE7DRIVE DRIVE SYSTEM
Apple IIc (USA)1 999 299 99 102* 1,499
Milmar2  1,144.7 561.9 415.9 131.0 2,028
Dif. 2/1 1,145 1,879 4.20 1,284 1,353
Unitron APII3  990.9 684.4 325.9 130.4 1,918
Dif. 3/1 0,991 2,282 3,291 1,278 1,279
4 925.7 684.4 324.9 130.4 1,860
Dif. 4/1 0,926 2,282 3,291 1,278 1,240
CCE Exato5  1,043.7 647.9 415.9 131 2,014
Dif. 5/1 1,044 2,166 4,201 1,284 1,343
Microengenho 6  1,298.8 782.3 412 195.5 2,420
Dif. 6/1 1,300 2,616 4,161 1,917 1,614
Average 7  1,080.7 672.2 379.1 143.7 2,048
Dif. 7/1 1,082 2,248 3,829 1,408 1,366
1) Sourme: C2nputer and Electronics, May 1984.
2) " Casa Garson - Rio
3) " Clappy - Rio
4) " " "
5) " Casa Garson - Rio
6) " esbla - Rio
7) Including 10% discount price.
8) Estimate.
8FIGURE 2 - Apple Ile and its compatibles manufactured
in Brazil
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The analysis of the TRS-80 line has also revealed improve-
ments in price-competitiveness of locally-manufactured clones.
From January 1983 to May 1984 the CP 500 micro manufactured by
Prologica had reduced the Brazil-USA relative price difference
from 2.79 to 1.42. Other manufacturer (Sysdata) was selling a
similar equipment cheaper than in the USA. In May 1984 the average
overprice in Brazil was 18% (See Table 4 and "Pigures 3 and 4).
9FIGURE 3 - Evolution of the TRS 80 model TI L price in t-he U-
and its clones in Brazil
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TABLE 4 - Market prices of the TRS 80 model III in USA and its
clones in Brazil
CPU 16 k CPU 48k/64 w/ 1 CPU 48/64 w/ 2 drives
___________ _ Ddrive _
Cr$ US$ B/' Cr$ US$ DIF. Cr$ US$ DIF.
TRS-80
III/A IV - 799 1,00 - 1385 1,00 - 1579 100
CP-5001  - - - 2800 1825 1 ,31 3450 2249 142
CP-300 - - - - - - - - -
SYSIATA JR. 510 332 0,41 1463 954 0,67 1728 1522 0,96
DGT 1000 8901 580 0,72 2157 1310 0,95 2818 1837 1,16
MiDIA* 456 0,56 2140 1363 0,98 2665 1869 1,18
(1) May/84
(2) Sysdata Jr.II (48k + 1 Drive)
(*) Cr$/US$ 1.534,00.
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FIGURE 4 - Market prices of the TRS 80 model III and its clones
in Brazil
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Hewlett Packard of Brazil also reduced the price of the
locally manufactured microcomputer HP 85 significantly. From
November 1982 to May 1984 the price difference went from 2.746
to 1.375 (See Figure 5).
FIGURE 5 - Evolution of the HP 85 price in Brazil and USA.
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Table 6 shows the average price difference between the
various microcomputers manufactured in Brazil and in the US. It
can be noted that HP presents a slightly higher price difference
than the average Brazilian manufacturers. This shows that local
manufacturing by multinational corporations does not necessarily
grant a better price to local users. This occurs because multi-
nationals usually adopt a centralized, worldwide product strategy.
Consequently their computers contain a lower proportion of local
components than products designed locally. In some cases, simple
components are imported because local subsidiaries are not flexible
enough to make the product changes required to utilize locally
manufactured components. Due to tariff barriers, there is a likely
connection between the content of locally manufactured components
and price competitiveness.
TABLE 6 - Average price differences between computers manufactured
in Brazil and in the US.
Product Line. Average price Difference
CPU Sstem (Mo~nitor,CPU + 2 Drives)
APPLE II 8,2% 36,6%
HP 85-A 37,5%
HP 85-B 48,8%
TRS 80 (2,0%) 18,0%
The research did not include detailed price comparison
with countries other than the US. However, a study published by
Creative Strategies International showed that in Mexico, in 1981,
the price of the original Apple II Plus was twice as much as in the
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US. The price difference was due to higher sale costs and profit
rates obtained by local dealers, since the equipment was in great
demand. In that year Apple Inc. sold 2,000 microcomputers locally,
corresponding to a 40% market share.
The Mexican case shows that a liberal import policy does not
necessarily benefit final users. By the end of 1981, the Mexican
government introduced import restrictions for microcomputers as a
part of a policy designed to develop a local industry.
Brazilian microcomputer manufacturers' executives inter-
viewed distinguished two major reasons for price reductions:
learning and economies of scale. The learning process enabled
manufacturers to increase produtivity and improve the pace of stock
rotation. Stock rotation is very important to save working capital
at a time of high inflation (250% a year) and high interest rates.
The larger scale of operations enabled the dispersion of
engineering and management costs over higher production levels.
Some firms started manufacturing only 10 units a month and now
produce over 400. Consequently they could introduce new equipment
such as automatic insertion of components, thus obtaining important
cost reductions. Intense competition in the Brazilian microcomputer
market pushed firms to concentrate efforts in reducing costs and
prices.
The observed improvements in the price competitiveness of
Brazilian microcomputers has important policy implications. The
decision whether or not to promote a new industry should not be
based on initial costs considerations only. It must take into
account the market growth perspectives iid the learning capacity of
local firms. Protection against foreign manufacturers may constitute
a charge for end-users. However, if technical capabilities are
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built and market potentials explored, local products might became
competitive in a short enough period to make the present value
of future benefits (discounted at an appropriate rate) larger than
the costs of protection.
Technology Gap
The imitative strategy pursued by most microcomputer manu-
facturers implies the existence of a certain technology gap, since
they tend to copy products which are already available in the
international market. In Brazil, local manufacturers have succeeded
in incorporating innovations introduced in the Apple II and TRS 80
with a gap of less than a year. In 1984 changes included keyboards
and display expansions, higher electronic board density and memory
expansions. The introduction of these minor changes in locally
manufactured equipment is only a question of time, since they do
not involve major technical difficulties for local manufacturers.
It can be argued, therefore, that in those product lines there is
a small gap in product specifications but not in technology. A
technology gap occurs only when leader firms introduce completely
new products or devices which technology are not acessible or fully
understood by competitors. In that case, there is not only a gap in
product design but also a technology barrier for other firms.
Identification of the technology gap between equipment
manufactured in Brazil and abroad is important. Even more important,
however, is to evaluate the importance of such a gap for local users.
Sometimes, product changes introduced abroad are less important for
local users than less sophisticated devices designed to match local
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requirements -- as, for example, keyboards with Portuguese language
characters. According to Prologica, 80% of its customers are small
or medium-si ze f i rms us:ing dat a proces! i ng for t he f i rs t t i me . They
use microcomputers to perform a limited range of operations such
as payroll processing, stock control and accounting. So, most
firms are not really interested in special features of the type
required by the sophisticated American market.
The imitative strategy does not necessarily imply the
notion of dependence. Firms which mastered reverse engineering
techniques are independent in their technical choices. They
usually reproduce solutions adopted by foreign manufacturers
utilizing a more limited choice of components, since- they have to
comply with government requirements of high content of locally
manufactured components.
Firms which adopt reverse-engineering as a product strategy
are not necessarily interested in copying a good product design.
Rather, the main advantage of such a strategy is to become compatible
in software and to join a market which is already known by final
users. Computer brands such as IBM and Apple are becoming a "de
facto" standard in the world market. Only a small minority of firms
in any country are willing to follow an independent standard for
microcomputers. Even traditionally innovative firms such as Tandy/
Radio Shack are turning to the production of microcomputers compa-
tible with the IBM PC. In Brazil, a technical director of an Apple-
clone manufacturer mentioned that, during the reverse engineering
process, they found a mistake in the circuitry design of the
original equipment. After examining alternative solutions they
decided not to change the original design, because this would
imply a loss in compatibility. So, it is necessary to keep even
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mistake compatibility in order to gain access to the "Apple market"
which represents about 1/4 of the world microcomputer market.
However, keeping compatibility may become a difficult task
in the near future. Although the new Macintosh microcomputer
launched in February 1984 by Apple Inc. utilizes a standard micro-
processor (the 32 bit MC 68000), it has some exclusively designed
integrated circuits such as the DMA device for memory access and the
parallel interface controler. Since compatible manufacturers
cannot buy such components in the market, they may face problems
in designing products fully compatible to the Macintosh. According
to computer designers, some Brazilian firms already have technical
capabilities to design and develop advanced 32 bit microcomputers.
However, they could hardly produce twin copies of the Macintosh
as they did with the Apple II.
It is difficult to predict whether the imitative strategy
is limited in time. But if copying successful products at
competitive costs became impossible, there are two alternatives to
the local industry. One is to enter joint venture or licensing
agreements with the world industry leaders. Such a strategy is
already being pursued by Brazilian manufacturers of superminis and
mainframe computers.
The other is to keep independence by boosting local research
and development activities in a strategy designed to master the
know-how required to develop original products or products compati-
ble with the industry leaders but utilizing different technical
solutions.
The first alternative has the advantage of being less risky
for individual firms than the second one. However it has some
important limitations such as:
* licensing strategy depends on the willingness of licensors
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to release technology early in the product cycle. Although there
is evidence that most multinationals are becoming more flexible in
exploring their technology assets overseas (See Baranson, 1978)
it is hardly likely that IBM sells technology without equity
control.
* Products manufactured under licensing have typically
poor export perspectives (See Tigre, 1982).
* Licensing presents fewer opportunities for learning by
doing and technology advancement than local product development.
The second strategy is obviously more risky and requires a
higher degree of state intervention. This includes protectionism and
government investment for developing local technical and scientific
infrastructure and financial support for firms' R&D activities.
However it has the advantages of opening wider possibilities for
local industry long-term survival, exports,appropriateness for local
needs and technology autonomy in a field which constitutes
cutting edge of modern indubstry.
The choice between these two strategies is mainly a matter
of political will. However, some kind of combination of strategies
in different market segments will probably be necessary in order
to keep the national goals of technological development compatible
with the individual interest of users and manufacturers.
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